Initial yields on both AAA-rated and non-AAA rated mortgage-backed security (MBS) tranches sold by large issuers are higher than yields on similar tranches sold by small issuers during the market boom years of 2004 to 2006. Moreover, the prices of MBS sold by large issuers drop more than those sold by small issuers, and the differences are concentrated among tranches issued during 2004 to 2006. These results suggest that investors price the risk that large issuers received more inflated ratings than small issuers, especially during boom periods.
R are incorporated into regulations of many financial institutions. Abundant evidence shows that credit ratings contain information not imbedded in prices for corporate bonds, and Jorion, Zhu, and Shi (2005) show that the impact of rating changes on stock prices becomes stronger after Reg-FD. Ratings are also shown to be an important determinant of corporate decisions such as capital structure (e.g., Kisgen (2006) ).
Rating agencies, however, have come under criticism for practices that may have spurred undue expansion and then collapse of the MBS market. Many critics emphasize a potential conflict in the way agencies structure their fees. Instead of being compensated by "consumers" (e.g., institutional investors) for producing high-quality ratings, agencies are paid by issuers. The conflict of interest hypothesis thus posits that rating agencies may grant more favorable ratings to issuers who may be able to bring, or potentially take away, substantial current and future business. In addition, regulations contingent on ratings may further distort the incentives of both issuers and rating agencies, since holding highly rated MBS securities lowers the burden of capital requirements.
The risk of lost reputation weighs against potential conflicts of interest for the rating agencies. As recent theoretical work shows, however, several forces may have tilted toward rating "inflation," especially for large MBS issuers. Unlike the corporate bonds market, a small number of large issuers of MBS bring many deals to the rating agencies and thus may have greater bargaining power than large bond issuers (e.g., Frenkel (2010) ). Perverse incentives of the rating agencies worsen during market booms, when the short-term benefits of additional rating business net of potential reputational costs are the highest (e.g., Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2010) , Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) ). Moreover, more complicated MBS tranches were packaged and sold during 2004 to 2006, thereby increasing ratings disagreement. Disagreement increases issuers' incentive to "shop for better ratings," even if each rating agency truthfully reports its findings, because an issuer can purchase and report the most favorable rating(s) after receiving preliminary opinions from multiple agencies. Shopping may thus lead to inflated ratings (e.g., Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009) , Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) ). To summarize, the booming housing and MBS markets between 2004 and 2006 , with the associated growth in revenues for rating agencies and increased complexity of deals, may have worsened conflicts of interest and pushed toward leniency. These observations provide the basis of our empirical tests.
We match price histories, initial yields, and ratings from Moody's, S&P, and Fitch for a large sample of privately issued (i.e., not backed by governmentsponsored enterprises, or GSEs) MBS between 2000 and 2006 with information on the market share of issuers. 1 We also obtain information on the characteristics of the tranches (e.g., size of principal amount, weighted average life, 1 Throughout most of our sample period there were just four Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations (NRSROs)-Moody's, S&P, Fitch, and DBRS, which achieved NRSRO status in 2003. However, DBRS focused almost exclusively on the corporate bond market (Kisgen and Strahan (2010) ). geographical distribution of the underlying mortgages), deals (e.g., number of tranches, degree of subordination), as well as issuers (e.g., issuer type and rating at the issuance date). Our tests are based on cross-sectional differences between tranches sold by large issuers versus small issuers (where issuer size is based on the issuing institutions' one-year lagged annual market share), between tranches sold by regulated versus less-regulated issuers, and between tranches sold in market boom years versus earlier years.
The fraction of a deal financed at AAA (highest possible rating) offers a simple measure of the aggressiveness with which a deal has been rated. Using a small set of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) issued between 1997 and 2007 for which they have the full set of collateral characteristics, Griffin and Tang (2012) document that a major rating agency increased the fraction rated AAA by 12% on average, relative to what was implied by their quantitative models, consistent with ratings inflation. Our study differs from theirs in that we explore a much broader set of deals, including all residential and commercial MBS available from SDC and Bloomberg. Our approach allows us to test how issuer characteristics (e.g., issuer size and regulatory status) and market conditions affected market expectations about the integrity of the rating process. The disadvantage, however, is that we have less ability to control fully for collateral quality. Thus, rather than model the fraction rated AAA, we focus on market prices.
If rating agencies treat different kinds of MBS issuers equally, yields on similarly rated securities ought to be similar; that is, they ought not to reflect issuer characteristics. Conversely, if investor concerns about ratings inflation worsen with issuer size, then yields may reflect such concerns. In our primary set of tests we thus compare initial yields (ex ante credit quality) of tranches sold by large versus small issuers, conditional on the credit rating. This yield spread is about 10% higher on tranches sold by large issuers than on similarly rated tranches issued by small issuers during market boom years. 2 The effect is similar in both AAA and non-AAA markets, suggesting that investors are skeptical even of tranches receiving the highest possible rating. The estimated coefficients translate into an increase in yields of about 15 basis points (bps), relative to a mean spread of 147 bps, for large-issuer tranches. We find no significant difference in yield spreads, however, during non-boom years. This result implies that investors recognize that potential conflicts of interest may worsen during booms, leading to compromise in the rating process, and, as a result, demand a price discount on the large-issuer tranches. These results are robust to the inclusion of issuer fixed effects.
The credit rating process, beyond conflicts related to the issuer-pay fee structure, may also have been distorted by financial institutions' attempts to exploit "regulatory arbitrage" opportunities. For example, banks could reduce required capital by transforming mortgages (held in the banking book) to highly rated R MBS held in the trading book (Acharya and Richardson (2009) ). In addition, in July 2004 the U.S. bank and thrift regulators exempted depository institutions from FASB rule "Fin 46," which had forced consolidation of most securitized assets onto the balance sheet in the aftermath of the Enron scandal. This ruling allowed depositories to create "shadow banks," off-balance sheet conduits holding long-term securitized assets financed with short-term asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). These structures reduced the capital requirement to zero, while leaving all of the risk with the issuing banks, which typically provided the conduits with liquidity guarantees to facilitate the sale of the ABCPs (Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2012) ). Following this decision, the ABCP market boomed, with outstandings rising from about $600 billion in July 2004 to its peak of $1.2 trillion by the summer of 2007. We find that MBS issued by depositories following the July 2004 decision had yields about 10% to 17% higher than tranches sold by less regulated institutions. We also find higher yields on AAA-rated tranches of more complex deals, proxied by the number of tranches (Furfine (2010) ), as well as a trend increase in deal complexity during 2004 to 2006. Overall, both increasing deal complexity and regulatory arbitrage did seem to have distorted the rating process and markets (Opp, Opp, and Harris (2012) ). Controlling for both effects, however, changes neither the magnitude nor the significance of the effect of issuer size on yields.
We also obtain a number of interesting results on how the market prices MBS tranches. For example, more ratings equate to lower yields. This effect is most pronounced among small issuers in the AAA market. Specifically, AAA tranches issued by small issuers have yields about 19% higher when rated by one agency compared to similar tranches rated by all three agencies. This suggests that investors price the risk that issuers shopped for the best rating when tranches have fewer than three ratings. By shopping, an issuer could censor out pessimistic ratings, thus reducing the number of ratings observed by investors.
3 Consistent with this incentive, we also find that tranches issued where rating agencies disagree have initial yield spreads that are 10% higher than those of tranches receiving the same rating across multiple agencies.
In the secondary set of tests, we also examine the ex post performance of MBS securities by looking at price changes between origination and April 2009. Both AAA-and non-AAA-rated tranches sold by larger issuers in the boom perform worse than similar tranches sold by smaller issuers-during boom years, prices for these large-issuer tranches drop about 10% more than prices for similar tranches sold by small issuers. (This result is robust to the inclusion of issuer fixed effects for the non-AAA rated tranches only.) In addition, we find that price changes are attenuated slightly when we control for the initial yield, suggesting that markets rationally incorporate concerns about the rating process into ex ante pricing.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the role of credit ratings in the financial crisis. Prior work examines lending practices as a potential cause for the run-up in house prices (e.g., Mian and Sufi (2009) , Keys et al. (2010) , Loutskina and Strahan (2010) ). Several papers empirically examine credit ratings in structured finance markets (e.g., Adelino (2009) , Dlugosz (2009a, 2009b) , Nadauld and Sherlund (2009), Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2010) , Demiroglu and James (2010) , Griffin and Tang (2012) ). These studies find that ratings are not always accurate measures of default risk; nor are they a sufficient statistic for risk. Adelino (2009) shows that yield spreads add incremental explanatory power beyond ratings in forecasting defaults. Griffin and Tang (2012) document flaws in how rating agencies use their internal models, and Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2010) show that simple observable measures of collateral risk forecast default conditional on the credit rating in a sample of Alt-A and subprime MBS. Our paper is the first to test for incentive problems related to issuer size, and to test whether the market incorporates concerns about the integrity of the rating process into ex ante pricing and ex post performance.
Prior research also examines conflicts of interest facing financial institutions such as investment banks (e.g., Kisgen, Qian, and Song (2009) ) and subprime lenders (e.g., Alexander et al. (2002) ), but studies of conflicts facing rating agencies focus mainly on the corporate bond market (e.g., Becker and Milbourn (2010) , Bongaerts, Cremers, and Goetzmann (2012) ). Our work shows that conflicts may be exacerbated in new and booming markets such as MBS, and also that investor wariness of this problem affects prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I we review the evolution of the MBS markets and discuss our hypotheses and tests. We then introduce our data on MBS securities in Section II and present results from our empirical tests in Section III. We conclude in Section IV.
I. Overview of Credit Ratings and MBS Markets
Prior research documents that rating agencies play a key role in the traditional corporate bond market. Credit ratings are perhaps more important in the recently developed markets for structured finance products, including MBS securities, for several reasons. For one, the cash flows and risks of corporate bonds are tied to the performance and prospects of one company. By contrast, structured finance involves a complicated securitization process, with pooling and tranching of credit-sensitive assets. For a fixed collateral pool (in the case of MBS these would be home mortgages), structured finance separates payments to investors into prioritized claims called "tranches," which absorb losses from the underlying portfolio following seniority. Hence, ratings depend on the quality of the collateral as well as the seniority and degree of subordination of the tranche. While securitization has revolutionized fixed income markets and brought billions of dollars to investment banks, for many investors this process can be opaque and tainted by asymmetric R information and moral hazard problems. 4 To the extent that uninformed investors trust the rating agencies to assess these complicated securities, credit ratings likely play a more important role in the structured finance product market than in the corporate bond market, where independent research is more feasible.
There is also strong demand among various types of institutional investors. For pension fund managers focusing on the fixed income markets and seeking high returns but constrained by the level of risk, highly rated MBS tranches offer an ideal vehicle. The securitization process described above can produce many more AAA-rated tranches than the fraction of AAA-rated corporate bonds (just 1% of which are AAA rated). The pooling and tranching process eliminates most of the idiosyncratic risk of the underlying assets, while the remaining systematic risk leads to higher expected returns (Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009a) ). For banks, broker dealers, and insurance companies, credit ratings affect the amount of capital needed to hold in reserve. Seemingly safe AAArated structured finance products also expand the supply of collateral to back repurchase agreements that many money market mutual funds use to manage their liquidity risk (Gorton and Metrick (2011) ). Moreover, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchased huge volumes of AAA-rated structured MBS that they could finance at below-market borrowing rates due to their special status as government-sponsored enterprises.
For rating agencies, the new fixed income products emerging out of the growth of structured finance provide substantial revenue potential beyond their traditional market of corporate bonds. The total volume of originations of subprime mortgages, for example, rose from $65 billion in the late 1990s to over $600 billion in 2006. In the case of Moody's, profits tripled between 2002 and 2006. At the peak of the market, Moody's disclosed that 44% of its revenues came from rating structured finance products, exceeding the 32% earned from rating corporate bonds. There is also direct evidence that rating agencies offer price discounts for large and frequent issuers of corporate bonds. 5 It is natural to expect that such practice also exists in dealing with large issuers of structured finance products including MBS. As pointed out above, issuance is more highly concentrated in structured finance, with large financial institutions such as banks and investment banks being key players. This concentration implies that some large issuers have substantial bargaining power as they can bring, and certainly take away, rating business. The confluence of tremendous new 4 See, for example, Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009b) for a review of structured finance, and Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) for a review of potential problems of the securitization process. See Keys et al. (2010) for evidence that securitization led to lax screening by lenders.
5 According to S&P's disclosure reports (including rating fee structure) in 2008, corporate issuers typically pay "up to 4.25 bps for most transactions" and the minimum fee is $67,500. In addition, "S&P will consider alternative fee arrangements for large volume issuers and other companies that want multi-year ratings services agreements" (Standard and Poor's (2008) ). See Becker and Milbourn (2010) for more details on the practice of rating agencies in the corporate bond market.
revenue flows in the late 2000s with significant bargaining power of large issuers thus worsened the conflict of interest problem inherent in the agencies' issuer-pay fee structure. 6 Given these potential conflicts, we test whether investors priced the risk that credit rating agencies favored large issuers over small ones, and whether this effect grew stronger as the market boomed. Ratings shopping may also compromise the integrity of the rating process. Issuers sometimes receive preliminary opinions to determine whether to purchase a rating. Shoppers will tend to censor out pessimistic ratings, thus leading to inflated purchased and observed ratings, regardless of whether rating agencies truthfully convey their own information. The direct impact of ratings shopping is not observable, since issuers are not required to disclose all the contacts they have made with rating agencies (see Sangiorgi and Spatt (2010) for more details). We do, however, control for the potential effects of shopping by including the number of reported ratings and rating disagreement among multiple agencies. Finally, given the significant benefits of packaging and holding highly rated MBS securities, we examine whether ratings-based regulations further alter the incentives of both issuers and rating agencies. For example, institutions facing tighter regulations may securitize their assets more aggressively, which leads to differences in deal structure, collateral quality, and pricing.
We build a large sample of non-GSE-backed MBS tranches issued during the period 2000 to 2006, matched to characteristics of their issuers. As discussed above, we take a valuation from outside approach to examine our main hypotheses-whether and when investors and markets recognize potential problems in the rating process. For example, investors may have initially failed to distinguish the credit quality of similarly rated tranches based on issuer size. Later on, as the housing market began to unwind, investors may have begun to recognize the difference in these two groups and adjusted yields accordingly.
We conduct both an ex ante price test and an ex post performance test. First, we examine whether investors and the market recognize potential ratings inflation when they price tranches at issuance, conditional on the credit rating. We compare the yields (at issuance) on securities sold by large versus small issuers. If the market believes that large issuers receive more favorable treatment from rating agencies due to the reasons discussed above, then their tranches ought to have higher credit risk (due to more aggressive subordination structures and/or riskier underlying collateral) and thus command higher initial yields. Second, we study the post-issuance performance of these two groups of securities by looking at their (cumulative) price changes between origination and April 2009. If large issuers enjoy favorable ratings and the market does not 6 Rating agencies have also been criticized for using models that tend to overestimate the likelihood of rising and high levels of housing prices, and thus underestimate the default risk of MBS securities. Our focus is not on the accuracy of these rating models per se, but rather on whether and how the market prices MBS securities issued by large versus small issuers differently due to the possible conflict of interest problem. R fully price this into initial yields, then the securities they sell ought to perform worse than otherwise similar securities sold by small issuers when the market worsens in 2007. Taken together, these two sets of results should give us a much better idea of how the adverse incentive problem may affect the quality of ratings during one of the worst crises in history.
II. Data and Methods
We begin the process of data compilation with the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) database, which provides a large sample of tranches of privately issued (i.e., non-GSE) MBS deals. For each deal, SDC provides basic information on asset/collateral types (mortgage, credit card, auto loans, bonds, etc.), the number of tranches, as well as the issuer(s) and bookrunner(s). For other deal and tranche characteristics, including initial and subsequent ratings and prices, principal amount, coupon type and rate, and maturity (weighted average life, and whether the tranche is paid off prior to April 2009), we rely on manually collected data from Bloomberg. Our sample includes MBS deals originated and issued in 2000 through 2006, and we follow the prices of these deals through April of 2009.
A. Empirical Models
We estimate two sets of models relating issuer size and market conditions to (1) yield spreads at issuance and (2) price changes from the issuance date to April 2009. The key explanatory variables are the lagged market share of the issuer (Issuer Share) and its interaction with HOT, defined as the fraction of the total principal amount of all tranches issued in a given year over the total amount issued across all years. To summarize analytically, 
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The data vary by year (t), issuer (k), deal (i), and tranche (j). In analyzing ex ante pricing (Equation 1), estimated at the tranche level, we control for variables related to deal structure in some specifications (e.g., Fraction AAA, or, for non-AAA tranches, Level of Subordination). In Equation (2), we introduce Log of Yield Spread as an additional regressor in some models, since this variable is predetermined relative to the ex post outcome. We also report equations (1) and (2) in their reduced forms-that is, without including Fraction AAA (and other deal structure terms) in (1) and without deal structure terms and Log of Yield Spread in (2)-to estimate the total impact of issuer size on yields and price changes.
In all of our tests, we include issuance-year fixed effects, and we doublecluster for all tranches sold by the same issuer and in the same year to build standard errors.
7 Note that by including the issuance-year effects, we absorb the direct effect of HOT, which has only time variation but no cross-sectional variation; hence, we only report its interaction with issuer size. We also report all of our models with and without issuer fixed effects.
B. Variable Construction and Summary Statistics
We obtain ratings from the largest three rating agencies, Moody's, S&P, and Fitch. More tranches are rated by S&P than Moody's or Fitch, but even Fitch rates over half of the tranches. Each of the three agencies rates around 60% of all the tranches AAA, but the AAA-rated tranches are larger and constitute about 90% of the total amount of financing. Table I , Panel A, reports summary statistics for the overall sample. We have two sets of market-based variables to measure ex ante pricing and ex post performance. Log of Yield Spread equals the natural log of the yield spread of a tranche at issuance. For a tranche with a floating coupon rate, the yield spread is defined as the fixed markup in bps over the reference rate specified at issuance (e.g., the one-month LIBOR rate). For a tranche with a fixed or variable coupon rate, the yield spread equals the difference between the initial coupon rate and the yield on a Treasury security whose maturity is closest to the tranche's weighted-average life. The mean yield spread is 147 bps over the whole sample; since there are on average about 15 tranches per deal, the sample for this variable has more than 65,000 observations (only about 2/3 of these observations end up in the regressions due to missing values on other dimensions). Price Change equals the percentage change in the price of R an MBS tranche between issuance and April 2009 (or its payoff date). 8 This sample is considerably smaller than the yield sample because Bloomberg only provides pricing history for the larger deals.
B.1. Dependent Variables
9 About 45% of the 9,299 tranches for which we have information on pricing history are paid off early and before the crisis, so the median price drop is only 0.8% while the mean drop is about 15%.
B.2. Issuer Characteristics
Our key explanatory variable of interest, Issuer Share, equals the number of MBS deals sold by an issuer over the total number of deals sold by all issuers in the previous year (using alternative measures of issuer market share based on the principal amounts generates very similar results). We denote market boom years through the continuous variable HOT, which varies from 5% in 2000 to its peak of 25% in 2006. We are interested in testing whether the effect of issuer size changes when markets boom, so we introduce the interaction variable Issuer Share × HOT.
Since the value of implicit recourse to investors may increase with issuer reputation, we control for Issuer Rating, equal to the numerical score for the rating of the issuer at the issuance date (AAA = 1; AA+ = 1.67, AA = 2, AA-= 2.33, and so on); the mean issuer rating is A. In our tests we also differentiate issuer types (Panel B, Table I ), and include an indicator equal to R one for banks and thrifts, which face tighter regulatory capital requirements than other MBS issuers such as finance companies (e.g., GMAC) or investment banks (e.g., Bear Stearns, Lehman, etc.). If regulatory arbitrage encourages regulated banks to securitize their assets more aggressively, then there may be differences in deal structure, collateral quality, and pricing. We also interact the regulatory indicator with a time indicator equal to one after July 2004, when the regulators exempted banks and thrifts from FASB rule FIN46 by allowing them to move assets into securitized conduits financed with ABCP. This regulatory decision led to a doubling of this financing mechanism-an increase of about $600 billion in the outstanding amount-over just three years. We also construct Same Originator Servicer, an indicator set to one if the originator and the servicer of the tranche are owned by the same firm and zero otherwise. Same Originator Servicer is only available for a subset of our data; hence we estimate our models with an additional indicator, Missing Originator Servicer, equal to one if the information on originator and servicer is not available. Table I , Panel A, also reports summary statistics for Fraction AAA, equal to the total principal amount of all the AAA tranches in an MBS deal divided by the total principal amount of all the rated tranches in the deal. Among the 5,548 deals for which we have information on the principal amount of all the tranches, an average of 89% of the dollar value is rated AAA (median is 94%). Initial Rating equals a numerical score based on the average of the ratings a tranche received at issuance. In the regressions, we estimate the AAA-rated sample separately from the sample of non-AAA tranches, and in the latter sample control for the rating with separate indicators for each distinct category based on the average score across ratings. This non-parametric strategy allows us to avoid imposing any functional relationship between the rating and pricing. As our main measure of deal structure, we add Level of Subordination (Panel A) for each tranche, defined as the dollar-weighted fraction of tranches in the same deal that have a rating the same as or better than the given tranche.
B.3. Deal Structure
10 For example, for a hypothetical $100 million deal with $80 million in the AAA tranche, $10 million in the BBB tranche, and another $10 million in the B tranche, Level of Subordination would equal 80% for AAA, 90% for BBB, and 100% for B. This variable increases as the amount of protection for a given tranche by lower-rated tranches decreases; this variable equals Fraction AAA for the AAA-rated tranches. Opp, Opp, and Harris (2012) show theoretically and Furfine (2010) empirically that more complex deals may lead to greater ratings inflation. To control for this mechanism, we add the log of the number of tranches within the deal.
We also control for deals with floating rate coupon tranches with an indicator variable. In addition, we control in some models for the number of ratings on a deal, using an indicator equal to one for deals with one rating and another equal to one for deals with two ratings. Issuers can pressure rating agencies by soliciting a preliminary opinion before deciding whether to purchase a rating. Hence, they may drop lower ratings after shopping their product to an agency. Thus, deals with just one or two ratings are more likely to have been shopped than those with three. Some deals with two or three ratings may also have been shopped, forcing the ratings to converge, but we do observe some tranches with multiple ratings where the agencies disagree. We control for this effect by adding another indicator for deals with more than one rating in which the ratings differ.
B.4. Collateral
We include a number of control variables to capture characteristics of the underlying collateral. From Panel A, Principal Amount equals the dollar value of the tranche; its distribution is highly skewed, with a mean of $65 million and median of $14 million. Weighted-Average Life, equal to the expected timing of payments of principal of a tranche, is also skewed with the mean of 5.6 years.
11
Fraction of Collateral in Troubled States equals the fraction of collateral originated in Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada. This variable measures the degree of exposure to areas that experienced the highest rise leading up to the crisis followed by the largest decline during the crisis.
12 Herfindahl Index of Collateral (HHI) measures geographical concentration of the collateral pool, equal to the sum of the squared shares of the collateral within a deal across each of the top five states (with the largest amount of mortgages), with the aggregation of all the other states as the sixth category. This variable controls, albeit crudely, for the degree of correlation across loans within a given pool. Table I , Panel B, describes the ratings distribution. Moody's and S&P both have similar market presence, rating more than 51,000 tranches, while Fitch rates more than 34,000. The majority of tranches receive two (66%) or three (14%) ratings, while almost 20% of the tranches have only one rating. Among tranches with two or three ratings, we observe disagreement about 13% of the time. For about 65% of the tranches, the same financial institution acts as 11 Note that this is not the same as duration, which measures the weighted-average time to maturity based on the relative present values of cash flows as weights (see, e.g., chapter 27 of Saunders and Cornett (2007) for more details). 12 We realize that the importance of this variable may be obvious only in hindsight, although some analysts were concerned about overheated regional markets in real time; nevertheless, all of our key findings are robust to the exclusion of this variable from our models. R both originator and servicer. Commercial banks are the most prevalent issuers, with about 39% of the deals, followed by investment banks (22%), thrifts (20%), finance companies (9%), and others (10%).
B.5. Sample Description
Panel C of Table I sorts the tranches into cohorts based on issuance year and issuer size. For these simple comparisons, "Big" refers to issuers with market share in the top 10% among all issuers (of a given year), and "Small" refers to all others. Not surprisingly, the volume of tranches, in terms of principal amount, is much greater during the housing market boom of 2004 to 2006. In our regressions below, we compare the characteristics of the two groups of MBS tranches issued by large versus small issuers across this boom period versus the earlier sample period (2000 to 2003) by interacting Market Share of Issuers with the (continuous) variable HOT as defined above. We report results excluding the tranches issued in 2007, as the housing and MBS markets clearly entered into a new regime as compared to the previous boom period. 13 From Panel C, tranches sold by small issuers appear to be larger in size and shorter in terms of weighted-average life, which tend to be safer, than those sold by large issuers. Tranches sold by small issuers also have less exposure to troubled states and are better diversified (lower Herfindahl index).
The numerical values of ratings indicate that tranches sold by small issuers receive worse ratings (e.g., Initial Rating has a higher mean and median) than those from large issuers, especially during the boom years of 2004 to 2006. On the other hand, small issuers themselves tend to have slightly better ratings than large issuers at the issuance date. MBS deals sold by large issuers also have less subordination-that it, a greater fraction of the deal receiving an AAA rating-than those sold by small issuers. Further, MBS deals put together by both small and large issuers have a significantly larger number of tranches during the boom period (more complexity), but deals from large issuers have more tranches than those from small issuers during both periods.
Tranches from small issuers are less likely to have a single rating and more likely to have ratings from all three agencies than tranches sold by large issuers. Perhaps not surprisingly, there is more disagreement (defined only for tranches with multiple ratings) during the boom years, given the large volume of risky deals sold in this period. But, as with levels of subordination, the gap in disagreement widens during the boom. During 2004 to 2006, for example, tranches sold by small issuers received different ratings 21% of the time, compared to just 14% of the time for large-issuer tranches. These comparisons suggest that large issuers shopped deals across agencies more aggressively than 13 According to the financial crisis timeline of the Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis, in February 2007 Freddie Mac announced that it will no longer buy the most risky subprime mortgage and mortgage-related securities; in April 2007 New Century Financial Corp., a leading subprime mortgage lender, filed for Ch. 11 bankruptcy; in June 2007 S&P and Moody downgraded over 100 bonds backed by second-lien subprime mortgages, and Bear Stearns informed investors that it was suspending redemptions from its High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund. All of these events suggest that the housing and MBS markets began to deteriorate in early 2007. When we include the 2007 observations in pooled regressions, we obtain qualitatively similar results.
smaller issuers. Finally, large issuers are more likely to act not only as the originator of the deal, but also the servicer, who is responsible for collecting interest payments after issuance. Small issuers, on the other hand, are more likely to sell deals with different servicers from the originators. This difference may in part reflect economies of scale at large mortgage banks such as Washington Mutual (WaMu). However, servicers may be unwilling to accept their role for tranches with high default risks; thus, having a different servicer from originator may provide a check and balance system when issuing the security.
Overall, these simple comparisons indicate that the quality of tranches issued by small issuers appears to be better than those sold by large issuers, despite receiving lower ratings on average. Moreover, large issuers seem to shop more for ratings-they are more likely to have one rating, and when they do have multiple ratings these ratings are more likely to agree. This difference is stronger during the boom years. Table II reports the top 10 issuers in each year of our sample period. The ranking for an institution in a given year is based on the number of deals issued during the year and information collected by SDC.
14 While the list of top 10 issuers changes over time, most if not all institutions on the lists are the well-known, largest institutions involved in various aspects of housing and subprime lending.
15 Interestingly, the top six issuers in 2006, Countrywide, GM (through its finance arm GMAC), Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, IndyMac, and WaMu all failed during the ensuing crisis. Moreover, Citigroup, the ninth largest issuer, received a large capital injection through the TARP program. The bottom row illustrates that the MBS market is highly concentrated among large issuers, in that the top 10 issuers account for 55% to 68% of all the newly issued securities each year over our sample period. As discussed above, the dominance of large issuers implies that they have considerable bargaining power over rating agencies.
III. Regressions Results
Tables III and IV report the main results on initial yields, estimated at the tranche level. In Table III , we regress the yield spread at issuance on characteristics of the deals and tranches, the issuer, and the market. Table IV reports similar regressions using samples split by issuer size to test whether deal characteristics are priced differently across issuer types. We then examine price changes in Table V (Equation 2) , also estimated at the tranche level, and we introduce Initial Yield Spread as a regressor.
14 Note that in Table II issuer rankings and market share are based on the number of deals (not weighted by deal size) sold in the current year, whereas in regression models below we use lagged market share (from the previous year). 15 We also rank bookrunners, or lead underwriters of the MBS securities, in each year. This list reflects the largest underwriters of structured finance products during this period, and overlaps with the list of largest issuers. We find (not reported) that the impact of ratings on the performance of tranches mostly comes through large issuers, not bookrunners. Initial Rating Category Dummies in Panels C and D are a set of dummies to indicate each level of the average ratings a given tranche received at issuance, after we convert the ratings into a numerical value by setting AAA , * * , and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) 
A. Yield Spread at Issuance
Does the market price the risk of agency problems-the risk of large-issuer deals? If larger issuers exert greater bargaining power, yield spreads should rise with issuer size conditional on the credit rating. Since the credit rating ideally acts as a sufficient statistic for risk (absent agency problems), it is less important to condition on the full set of collateral characteristics in this setting compared to modeling the fraction rated AAA, as in other studies (e.g., Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2010) , Griffin and Tang (2012) ). Thus, we compare how initial yields vary with issuer size controlling for the distribution of ratings (ratings indicators, the number of ratings, and a disagreement indicator). Since most of the securities are priced and sold at par, initial yield spreads gauge the market's assessment of ex ante credit quality (i.e., risk). Figure 1 presents suggestive evidence by plotting initial yield spreads for tranches sold by large versus small issuers. "Big issuer" indicates that the market share falls into the top 10% of the market share distribution in a given year, while "Small issuer" refers to the other issuers in the same year. As mentioned earlier, for a tranche with a floating coupon rate, yield spread is the fixed markup (in bps) over the benchmark rate; for a tranche with a fixed or variable coupon rate, yield spread is the difference between the initial coupon rate and the yield of a Treasury security whose maturity is closest to the tranche's weighted average life. Tranches are sorted by their issuance year (cohort), and we plot the median initial yield spread for each cohort of the two groups of tranches during 2000 to 2006. Figure 1 shows that yields on tranches sold by large issuers consistently exceed yields from small issuers, with the average difference about 18 bps. The gap in the yield spreads is the largest during the market boom period of 2004 to 2006, with the difference in 2004 over 37 bps. Table III tests whether the patterns in Figure 1 hold up after controlling for the initial rating of the tranche using a full set of indicators for each unique value of the average rating. Columns 1 and 2 control for collateral and issuer characteristics (reduced forms), and in the subsequent columns we add variables related to deal structure: Level of Subordination, One Initial Rating and Two Initial Rating indicators (to test for shopping), Rating Disagreement For a tranche with floating coupon, the yield spread is defined as the fixed markup over the benchmark rate specified at issuance (e.g., the one-month LIBOR rate). For a tranche with fixed or variable coupon, yield spread is defined as the difference between the initial coupon rate and the yield on a Treasury security whose maturity is closest to the tranche's weighted average life. Issuer market share is calculated as the number of deals originated by the issuer divided by the total number of deals in the current year. "Big issuer" means that the market share of the issuer falls into the top 10% of the market share distribution in that year, and "Small issuer" refers to the rest of issuers in that year.
indicator (equal to one for tranches with multiple ratings that disagree), and Log of Number of Tranches (a proxy for deal complexity). The dependent variable equals the natural log of the yield spread calculated at the issuance date. We split the sample into AAA-rated tranches (AAA-rated by all ratings) versus all non-AAA rated tranches, and we also include dummy variables for coupon types (floating, fixed, or variable; not reported in tables). Panel A, Table III , reports the yield results for AAA-rated tranches without issuer fixed effects. This model exploits cross-sectional as well as within-issuer time variation in market share. The yield on tranches sold by large issuers is on average higher than that on tranches sold by small issuers during boom years. The coefficient from the baseline model (Column 1, Panel A) is positive but not significant, but in Column 2 we find a strong interaction between issuer size and market conditions. In a hot year such as 2006 (when HOT = 0.25), the yield spread would be about 13% higher for an issuer with a 10% market share (such as Countrywide or GM) relative to a very small issuer (-1.23×0.1 + 9.8987×0.25×0.1 = 12.6%). This effect translates into a 19 bp increase in yields, somewhat smaller than the unconditional comparisons in Figure 1 . R Level of Subordination enters the yield spread regressions with a very strong positive coefficient, although its inclusion does little to the effects of issuer size; nor does it interact with market conditions (HOT). Increasing this variable from the 25 th to the 75 th percentile of its distribution would increase yield spreads by about 10%. This makes sense because Level of Subordination represents the degree of leverage in the tranche, so greater leverage implies greater risk and thus higher yields. We also find some evidence that regulatory distortions affected the ratings process. During the post-July 2004 period, tranches issued by banks and thrifts had yield spreads 10% to 15% higher than those sold by less regulated entities. This may reflect their greater incentive to securitize more aggressively to lower the effect of regulatory capital requirements.
Panel B of Table III reports the same set of models but includes issuer fixed effects. We find that the effects of issuer size (through interactions with HOT) are somewhat smaller but remain statistically significant. Magnitudes are only slightly smaller, despite the large decline in the interaction term, because the linear term switches sign. The yield spread would be about 10% higher for an issuer with a 10% market share relative to a very small issuer (0.38×0.1 + 2.623×0.25×0.1 = 10.4%), versus 13% from the model without fixed effects. The effects of subordination and the regulatory indicators are also similar. Interestingly, Issuer Rating enters the fixed effects model with a positive coefficient, suggesting that declines in an issuer's credit standing are priced into the deals that they sell, perhaps because the value of implicit recourse falls as issuer credit quality declines (Gorton and Souleles (2006) ). This effect only emerges in the fixed effects specification, however. We also find that the yield on tranches for which the same institution acts as originator and servicer is higher than that on tranches with different originator and servicer, and this result is robust to the inclusion of issuer fixed effects.
We also obtain a number of interesting results on how the market prices certain MBS tranches. For example, we find that the yield on AAA-rated tranches included in deals with a greater number of tranches is higher in both panels, indicating that investors are suspicious of the quality of more complicated deals. The coefficient in Column 3, Panel A, implies that, as the number of tranches in a deal doubles (the 25 th percentile of this variable is eight while the 75 th percentile is 19), the yield on the AAA tranche increases by a little more than 10%. This result is consistent with theories of ratings inflation based on regulation arbitrage (Opp, Opp, and Harris (2012) ) and asset complexity (Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009), Skreta and Veldkamp (2009) ). Controlling for the effect of deal complexity, however, does not change the link from issuer size to yield spreads. We also find that tranches with more underlying mortgages originated from troubled states (AZ, CA, FL, and NV) have higher yields (though not significant with issuer fixed effects). Interestingly, we find that better-diversified AAA-rated deals, as measured by the cross-state HHI, have higher yields (again only without fixed effects). This result supports the model of Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009a) , who show that AAA-rated structuredfinance deals with a high degree of diversification act like economic catastrophe bonds that would default only under dire economic scenarios. Thus, such bonds must offer high yields to compensate investors for bearing systematic risk.
For the non-AAA-rated tranches (Panels C and D), we find similar results for issuer size as in the AAA market. The magnitudes are a bit smaller in the models without fixed effects, and a bit larger in the models with fixed effects. Increasing issuer share from very small to 10% during a hot year would increase yield spreads by almost 10% (-1.04 × 0.1 + 7.91 × 0.25 × 0.1 = 9.8%) based on Column 2 of Panel C. In the models with fixed effects the magnitude increases to 17% (0.27 × 0.1 + 5.92 × 0.25 × 0.1 = 17.5%). The variables related to ratings shopping enter the non-AAA market with similar magnitude but greater statistical significance compared to the AAA market. We find that tranches with one rating have yields about 7% to 9% higher than those with all three ratings (the omitted group) and the tranches with two ratings have yields about 4% to 5% higher than the omitted group. Rating disagreement also enters the model very significantly-tranches with disagreement have 11% higher spreads-suggesting that there may be a large payoff to ratings shopping, since shopping could conceal the lower rating from investors.
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Table IV, Panel A, separates our sample into two groups based on issuer size (as in Table I ), and into another two groups based on AAA versus non-AAA (as in Table III ). We report just one specification for each of the four samples (without issuer fixed effects), and we do not include the issuer size variable itself since we have "controlled" for this factor through the sample split. This approach allows us to test whether other issuer as well as deal and tranche characteristics have different effects on yield depending on issuer size. The results suggest, first, that the effect of the level of subordination is consistent across the samples. For tranches sold by both large and small issuers, we find that more aggressive subordination leads to higher yields; moreover, the magnitude of this effect is similar across both samples (compare Column 1 with 2 and Column 3 with 4). We also find that the effects of regulatory status and deal complexity carry through to both samples. More complex deals-those with more tranches-have higher yields in both AAA samples, and the yields are higher for deals issued by banks and thrifts after 2004 for both samples.
We do find one significant difference across the two samples within the AAA market: the effect of multiple ratings is much more pronounced for tranches sold by small issuers. For these tranches, having three ratings is associated with much lower yields, on the order of 15% to 19% lower. We have argued that large issuers have more bargaining power when dealing with rating agencies than small issuers due to their greater market share. Hence, even if a tranche sold by a large issuer has multiple ratings, the market may remain suspicious of its quality-results from Table III confirm this as yields are higher on tranches sold by large issuers even after controlling for the number of ratings. On the other hand, when a tranche sold by a small issuer has only one or two ratings, the market can perhaps draw clearer inferences that the tranche has been 16 Rating Disagreement is undefined for the AAA sample because we only include tranches rated AAA by all the agencies that rated the tranche. R shopped-because it is doubtful that the issuer can push any one agency to alter the rating-and demand a greater price discount. Consistent with this interpretation, the frequency of having three ratings is much higher among small issuers than large ones (recall Table I ). Put slightly differently, investors are in a better position to judge whether small issuers have shopped their products (based on having one or two ratings) and punish them accordingly; hence it makes sense that small issuers are more likely to purchase multiple ratings, even when those ratings disagree.
In Panel B of Table IV , we illustrate the effect of issuer size on yields using the split-sample results. We compare the average yield for tranches actually sold by large issuers with the predicted yield for those same tranches using the coefficients from the small-issuer sample. The strategy offers a robustness test to our baseline analysis in Table III , where we constrain all of the effects of issuer characteristics to be the same across all tranches. We find results that are slightly larger in magnitude to the more parsimonious model. During the non-boom period (2000 to 2003), average yields for large-issuer tranches are just slightly higher than what would be predicted had those tranches been sold by small issuers: 176 versus 171 bps for AAA-rated and 182 versus 176 for non-AAA rated. During the boom years (2004 to 2006), however, the gap widens to about 15 bps. In the AAA market, the average yield for tranches sold by large issuers was 98 bps, compared to 83 bps that would have been predicted had those tranches been sold by small issuers (an increase of 18%). We find a similar gap in the non-AAA market. Thus, even allowing all of the coefficients to differ, we continue to find strong evidence that investors priced the risk that otherwise-similar tranches carry greater risk when sold by large issuers.
B. Ex Post Price Performance
Figure 2 presents simple unconditional graphical evidence on our second test-price change after issuance-for the two groups of securities. For all the tranches, the initial price is set at par-$100 per $100 face value, or very close to $100. We group tranches by their issuance year (cohort); Figure 2 and by large issuers dropped by 54% from the issuance date, as compared to a 37% drop by small issuers, a difference of 17 percentage points between these two groups. Table V reports regressions testing whether the patterns in Figure 2 continue to hold after adding control variables. As in Table III , we start with reduced form models that control for collateral and issuer characteristics, and include the full set of credit rating indicators for non-AAA tranches (Columns 1 and 2). We then add deal structure variables (Columns 3 to 6) and, at last, we add the ex ante log yield spread variable (Column 7). Adding the yield spread allows us to test the extent to which the market priced the risk of large-issuer deals. That is, if the market prices this risk, then the effect of issuer size ought to be attenuated or even eliminated in its ability to predict outcomes. The dependent variable is price change, for which we have one observation per tranche, calculated as the percentage change between the price during the first month after issuance and the final price as of April 2009 (if available) or the last available monthly price otherwise. As noted earlier, the sample is considerably smaller than our sample of initial yields (Tables III and IV) because Bloomberg only provides a pricing history on a subset of the tranches.
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As in Tables III and IV, Table V again separates results into AAA-rated tranches with and without issuer fixed effects (Panels A and B) versus all other tranches (Panels C and D). We find a negative and significant impact of issuer size for both samples during boom years, although not in the AAA sample with issuer fixed effects. The coefficients from the baseline models suggest that tranches sold by large issuers fell by about 10 percentage points more than those sold by small issuers in the AAA market during boom years (from Panel A, Column 2: 0.296 × 0.1 − 5.26 × 0.25 × 0.1 = −10%), and 11 percentage points more in the lower-rated tranches (from Panel C, Column 2: 1.188 × 0.1 − 9.23 × 0.25 × 0.1 = −11.2%).
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The results also suggest that market prices incorporate the ex post risk of a bad outcome, but only during the boom years. In both AAA and non-AAA rated tranches, the interaction between Log of Yield Spread with HOT is negative and significant. In Columns 6 and 7, we estimate the same sample with and without the yield variable to judge the extent to which adding pricing attenuates the effect of issuer size on ex post outcomes. The results suggest a small attenuation, but only in the AAA-rated sample.
C. Discussion
Overall, the results across Tables III and IV suggest that the market prices the risk of large-issuer sponsored deals, conditional on the credit rating and during the housing boom. The positive effect of issuer size during the boom is robust to including controls for regulatory arbitrage, to unobserved heterogeneity across issuers, and to various dimensions of deal structure, including 17 About 45% of the 9,299 tranches for which we have information on pricing history are paid off early and before the crisis. Once they are paid off, the ratings are withdrawn and reported price series stop. In robustness tests (results shown in the Internet Appendix, available at http://www.afajof.org/supplements.asp) we estimate our ex post performance regressions without tranches that are paid off early. The results are similar to those reported in Table V for the AAA market; for non-AAA tranches, the signs and statistical significance remain in most models, although the magnitudes fall. 18 We have also estimated the effect of issuer size for subsamples based on whether a deal is above or below the median geographical concentration and also whether a deal is above or below the median fraction of collateral in troubled states. We find that in each of these subsamples the ex post performance is worse among cohorts sold by large issuers during hot markets. These results are available in the Internet Appendix. the level of subordination. The level of subordination itself is also strongly correlated with yields; more aggressively structured deals require higher yields even conditioning on the rating, and this result is consistent and has similar magnitude for tranches sold by both large and small issuers. Yet adding this variable does little to the effect of issuer size on yield. In fact, the magnitudes are almost completely unaffected by all of the controls (other than the issuer fixed effects). Do higher yields for large-issuer MBS indicate that ratings were intentionally inflated more for them than for smaller issuers? This inference makes sense theoretically because greater deal flow enhances large issuers' bargaining power. But it is also possible that large issuers were merely better able to construct pools that would seem safer according to the models used to build the ratings. Our results do not allow us to separate these two possibilities because we do not look specifically at the rating process itself. In contrast, Griffin and Tang (2012) do present evidence that a major rating agency altered model results to inflate ratings on a small sample of CDOs, though they do not link the degree of inflation to the size of issuers. Based on our evidence, we can conclude that investors perceived higher risk in large-issuer sold deals (conditional on the rating). The ex post performance in Table V suggests that this pricing was sensible.
This discussion also raises the question of whether ratings inflation even matters. If investors can price risks, why do we care? First, not all investors are sophisticated, so inflated ratings may lead to misallocation of risk across the financial system (i.e., inefficient risk sharing). Second, even for sophisticated investors, the fact that the ratings process could be compromised is a problem as they may not know how much to trust the ratings, or how much information is in fact embedded in the ratings. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the regulation of large and "too big to let fail" financial institutions depended on the accuracy of credit ratings. Ratings inflation allowed these regulated firms to increase leverage beyond what was justified by their risks, thereby making the financial system as a whole more vulnerable to small shocks. The costs of this excess leverage became all too clear during the financial crisis. Efforts toward regulatory reform, such as the Dodd-Frank Act, reasonably recognize the danger of placing too much weight on credit ratings in devising regulations. The problem that Dodd-Frank does not address, however, is finding an alternative means to assess risk for regulatory compliance at a reasonable cost.
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IV. Conclusions
Our paper tests whether issuer size affected the pricing of MBS, one of the largest and fastest growing credit markets. Rating agencies play a crucial role in the corporate bond market, and were a key part of the rise and fall of the housing and MBS markets. It is perhaps not surprising to see that analytical models used by rating agencies were imperfect. Many sophisticated investors and policy makers systematically underestimated default risk in housing, particularly the risk that the whole U.S. housing market would decline simultaneously. Our findings, however, suggest that investors suspected that mistakes were systematically correlated with issuer size and market conditions: yields on tranches sold by large issuers were higher conditional on the credit rating and other controls. For both AAA-and non-AAA-rated tranches sold by large issuers, their prices drop more than similar tranches sold by smaller issuers when the housing bubble began to unravel. These performance differences are concentrated among deals packaged and sold during the market boom years of 2004 through 2006. We also find that ratings-based regulations and regulatory arbitrage of financial institutions distorted the rating process, but controlling for these effects does not change our main results on issuer size. Overall, we conclude that there is a robust relation between issuer size and the market prices of mortgage-backed securities conditional on ratings. Conflicts between the interests of issuers (who pay for ratings) versus those of investors (who consume ratings) may explain this relationship.
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